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The main hypothesis of this paper is that the Chilean economy's poor performance over the last two 
decades (e.g., average productivity growth collapsed by three quarters vis-à-vis the previous cycle) results 
from its development strategy having run its course ─being now in desperate need of a full “upgrade” 
(one capable of generating new engines of productivity growth; e.g., the industrialisation of commodities, 
a “green new deal”, or the spread of the new technological paradigm to the four corners of the economy).  
The same can be said of the neo-liberal ideology at its foundations, as most of its “absolute certainties” 
are being shaken to the core.  However, neither the (not so) invisible hand of distorted markets, nor centre-
left or centre-right governments have had much of a clue as to how to bring this change about.  There is 
also (unlike, say, in some Asian economies) a generalised lack of nerve to do anything about it.  
Consequently, the Chilean economy is now jammed in a rather transparent ─and self-made─ “middle-
income trap”.  In fact, change has come in the opposite direction: in order to reinforce the growingly 
fragile status quo, a new policy-straightjacket has been added in the form of the Transpacific Treaty, or 
TPP-11, which gives large corporations (foreign and domestic) a de facto veto against any change in 
policy.  In turn, the advanced countries’ “reverse catching-up” isn’t helping either, as this also helps 
reinforce the convictions of those in Chile defending the status quo.  We are all now indeed converging 
in the West, north and south, but towards Latin American features such as mobile élites creaming off the 
rewards of economic growth, and ‘magic realist’ politics that lack self-respect if not originality.  In fact, 
it is now even tempting to say to those in the high-income OECD “Welcome to the Third World”. 
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1  I am grateful to Manuel Llorca and Rory Miller for their contribution to this paper.  Ha-
Joon Chang, Camila Cociña, Rodrigo Caputo, Mariana Chudnovsky, Jonathan DiJohn, 
Bernardita Escobar, Jorge Fiori, Juliano Fiori, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Ester González, Pablo 
González, Daniel Hahn, Leonidas Montes, José Antonio Ocampo, Cristóbal Palma, Guillermo 
Paraje, Carlota Pérez, Manuel Riesco, Claudia Sanhueza, Ignês Sodré, Lance Taylor, Robert 
Wade, current and previous PhD students and many other colleagues have made valuable 
contributions to my work on this subject.  The usual caveats apply.   
When writing this paper, I couldn’t help wondering what my school-friend Eugenio Ruiz-
Tagle (1947-1973) would have made of where we are today.  This paper is dedicated to 
him.  (In Dante’s Inferno, there is a special circle of hell for people like those who inflicted 
such unimaginable cruelty on him ─as well as for those who applauded it).   
2  It could be said that this became the de facto motto of the political front “The 
Concertación” after it won the 1988 Plebiscite, which marked the beginning of the return to 
democracy.  
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1.- Introduction  
Chile’s economy since the return to democracy in 1990 has followed two different 
cycles: a dynamic one (1990-98) ─which had started in 1986─, then a poor one.  In 
the first it grew at 7.2% per annum (p.a.), while in the other (1998-2018) ─with 
“super-cycle” of commodities, easy borrowing and all─ at half that figure (3.7%).3  
The same is true for income per capita (pc): 5.5% vs. 2.6%.  
The driver of growth also switched from productivity to employment: while 
the latter remained stable despite the GDP slowdown (2.5% and 2.3%), productivity 
collapsed from 4.6% to 1.3%.  The key questions that emerge are the following:  
i) What led to the dynamism of the 1990s?  
ii) Why was the economy unable to sustain this drive, even though there was 
no change in policy or politics, and despite improving commodity prices and 
unprecedented easy access to cheap foreign finance?   
iii) Why was employment growth the exception in the downturn?  
iv) Why did productivity growth collapse?  And  
v) What can be done about it? 
Although numbers and theory can only come to life symbiotically, I shall discuss first 
the former (in an historical perspective) in Section two, and then the latter in Section 
three ─and always following Hobsbawm’s advice: “The business of historians is to 
remember what others forget”.4  
 
2.- Numbers  
2.1.- Any “catching-up” with the production frontier?  
The most revealing indicator of long-term performance for a high middle-income 
country is whether it is closing the productivity gap vis-à-vis the frontier.  Figure 
1 shows the relative productivity of the average Chilean and South Korean worker 
vis-à-vis the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
3  GGDP (2019); WDI (2019).  
4  Hobsbawm (1994). 
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FIGURE 1 
 
● a=1972 (the year before the Coup d'état); b=1982 crisis; c=return to democracy; 
d=end of the 1986-1998 cycle; and e=beginning of the “super-cycle” of commodity prices.  
3-year moving averages.  
● Source: GGDC (2019; US$2018, PPP).   
 
What a contrast!  And the same applies between other Latin American countries 
vis-à-vis emerging Asia (Figure 2).  While in Chile, other than having more cycles 
post-1973, there is little difference between the two post-war development 
strategies in their inability for sustainable “catching-up” (first import-substitution, 
ISI, and then the post-1973 one), in South Korea export-led industrialisation 
thrived.  In fact, Chile’s relative productivity today ─about 45% of the US’s in PPP 
dollars─ is exactly the same as well over half a century ago.  And in non-PPP, the 
picture is the same, with Chile hovering around 30%, and its 2019 level also 
similar to the mid-1950s.  This is a country caught in a true “middle-income trap” 
─as if there was a ‘glass ceiling’, which only emerging Asia knows how to break.  
Figure 1 also shows the two post-1990 cycles ─the 1990-98 dynamic one 
(“c” to “d”), and the post-1998 lacklustre one.  And it shows the wasted 
opportunities of the so-called “super-cycle” of commodity prices and the 
unprecedented access to cheap finance, which left no permanent “catching-up” 
trace.  However, they did leave another impact: during the “super-cycle”, Latin 
America increased its relative number of millionaires, centimillionaires and 
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billionaires faster than any other region, with Chile at or near the top (according 
to the category of millionaire).5  
Figure 1 also shows Chile’s monumental post-1982 collapse ─which 
brought the direct rule of the Chicago Boys to its ignominious end.  As the private 
sector’s excess expenditure (mostly consumption) approached nearly 20% of GDP 
on a quarterly basis, the following crash became Chile’s worst self-made crisis.  
These abrupt cycles are not found in emerging Asia, even though they had 
to deal with the same unstable world economy and self-destructive international 
finance, and their own financial turbulence (1982 and 1997).6  Their Keynesian 
pro-growth and anti-cyclical macroeconomics helped, while Latin America’s 
growing monotonic obsession with inflation targeting and pro-cyclical exchange 
rates, and Central Banks insisting that growth is someone else’s job, didn’t.  For 
Keynes, policy making is precisely about the opposite: the coordination of all 
aspects of policy.  Just imagine a car in which one person has the steering-wheel, 
another the clutch and the gear box, and yet another (an “independent” Central 
Bank) the accelerator and the brakes.  Not precisely the best setting for a smooth 
─and efficient─ ride.   
Finally, Figure 1 shows how remarkable Chile’s recovery from the 1982 
collapse was ─after the change of the economic guard at the palace, and in the 
capitalist élite (replacing those who’d gone bust due to astronomical debts).  This 
is what sets Chile apart in the region; others are still trying to recover their pre-
1982 relative productivity position vis-à-vis the US (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
5  Wealth development Report (2014).  
6  For South Korea’s macroeconomic policies, see Chang (1993); for Chile, Ffrench-Davis 
(2018).  For a comparison, Palma (2012).  For the subject in general, Taylor (2010).  
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FIGURE 2 
 
● ar=Argentina; br=Brazil; mx=Mexico; N1= emerging Asia’s first wave of 
industrialisation, Hong-Kong (h-k), Singapore (sg), South Korea (kr), and Taiwan (tw); 
N2=second wave, Malaysia (my); and N3=third wave, China (cn) and India (in).  3-year 
moving averages. 
● Source: GGDC (2019; US$2018, PPP).  Due to problems with Mexico’s pre-1990s 
employment data, I use relative income pc. 
 
Brazil and Mexico (like Chile) are today roughly as they were in the 1950s, having 
reversed all their 1960s and 1970s gains; while Gardel’s Argentina is still going 
downhill (“cuesta abajo en su rodada”). Mexico has at least stabilised its post-
1982 fall.   
There’s no such thing in emerging Asia as a middle-income trap (or 
artificially constructed “glass ceiling”, as in Chile), in any of its waves of 
industrialisation.  When Singapore split from Malaysia (1965, two years after 
independence) for example, its relative productivity was just 40% ─slightly below 
Chile’s 43%.  Less than 20 years later, while Chile had gone backwards (39%), 
Singapore was already ahead of the US in PPP terms. 
This comparison is relevant, as Singapore’s key driver of growth at the 
time was the rents from its main natural resource ─its port, which, like the canal 
in Panama, was the very reason for its colonial existence.7  Singapore kept it in 
the public sector to be able to use its rents and profits to finance its ambitious 
industrial and trade policies, which brought it from low-middle income to a 
                                          
7  Due to its geographical location and deep waters, the British East India Company 
invented Singapore as a trading post.  
 6
technological leader in one generation.  For this, and to finance its thriving 
educational and health sectors, it also used the profits from its many public sector 
enterprises, and the rents of its other natural resource, land ─in this free-market 
paradise, 87% of land is still owned by the government, and 85% of housing is 
supplied by the government housing board.8  In all, while Singapore increased its 
investment per worker by a factor of 11 during the three decades after 
independence, Chile did not even double this statistic during this period.  
That is, in (highly) right-wing Singapore, private sector “fetishism” has 
never been part of its pragmatic hegemonic ideology.  It simply made no sense to 
privatise its natural resources, as their rents and operating profits were needed to 
finance their huge investment drive.  Perhaps that’s the difference between 
wanting to build a nation, or just a country ruled by natural-resource-grabbing 
“silly-billies” (as the Financial Times now calls Latin-style billionaires). 
In fact, Singapore’s development strategy is similar to what President 
Balmaceda had tried in the 1880s with Chile’s rents from nitrates (see below).  
While the capitalist élite in Singapore supported this development strategy, most 
of Chile’s oligarchy opposed Balmaceda bitterly ─as it would “shift gear” in this 
lethargic and mostly pre-capitalist economy and society.  It created such 
institutional strains, that the country ended up in its first major civil war in over 
half a century ─one in which the traditional oligarchy and its British allies (those 
at the receiving end of Balmaceda’s nitrate royalties) were destined to win after 
the forced conscription of the nitrate miners from the north.  A mostly peasant 
army from the South was no match for them.  
In Singapore, meanwhile, it made a lot of (capitalist) sense for its “market-
friendly” political élite to use the rents of natural resources productively, and to give 
state-owned enterprises a substantial role ─especially in its “catching-up” stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
8  See Chang and Rowthorn (1995).  
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2.2.- Growth of GDP, employment and productivity 
FIGURE 3 
 
● Productivity=output per worker.  3-year moving averages. 
● Source: GGDC (2019; US$2018, PPP). 
 
Figure 3 shows a (conveniently) oft-forgotten stylised fact: Chile’s long-term 
GDP-performance was identical in its post-war ISI and its post-1973 periods, 
despite their hugely different natures (4.2% p.a.).  It seems that the 
undercurrents that really matter for the growth performance of the Chilean 
economy are more complex than just policy prescriptions.  
However, this similarity differed in its inputs (employment and 
productivity).  During ISI, productivity grew twice as fast as employment (2.8% 
and 1.4%), but during the long post-1973 period the opposite is the case (2.5% 
vs. 1.6%).  That is, while employment growth nearly doubled, productivity 
growth ─despite its 1986-98 remarkable period ─ moved (cyclically) in the 
opposite direction.  In all, between 1974 and 2018 employment generated about 
two-thirds of GDP-growth, but 80% of it ended up in low productivity (and low-
productivity growth potential) services and construction ─up from about half in 
the early 1970s.  In turn, and despite the vibrant 1986-98 period, average 
productivity growth fell by nearly half, as during its first twelve years (1974-
1986) productivity actually declined, and during the two post-1998 decades it 
grew by just 1.3% p.a.  In fact, during 33 of the 45 years of the post 1973 
development strategy (the 1974-1986 and 1998-2018 periods ─i.e., excluding 
1986-1998) productivity grew on average by less than 0.7% p.a. (or just 26% in 
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all).  That is, as far as productivity growth, there was a highly-dynamic 12-year 
period (1986-1998), and two poor ones at each side of it ─especially its first 
pitiful one.  
The post-1998 productivity growth slowdown originated from the two key 
areas of the dual economy getting stuck in their respective middle-income traps 
─i.e., both were unable to “upgrade” (as South Korea and Singapore, among 
others in emerging Asia, had done).  While the export sector proved unable to 
move on from its purely extractive activities, the non-tradable sector remained 
stuck in labour-intensive, but low-productivity growth potential activities.  This is 
where the key problem of the current Chilean economy lies.  Krugman is surely 
right: although “productivity isn't everything, … in the long run it is almost 
everything”.9  
Lack of “upgrade” meant that as its purely extractive cycle showed signs 
of reaching its full potential (especially in mining), Chile’s export growth collapsed 
despite the “super-cycle” of commodity prices and easy access to finance (Figure 
4).   
FIGURE 4 
 
● 3-year moving averages. 
● Source: WDI (2019; US$2010).   
 
2.3.- The sectoral composition of output  
Figure 5 highlights the growing “dual” nature of the economy since the 1970s’ 
neo-liberal reforms.  In fact, sectors coexisted side-by-side that had labour 
productivity differentials of up to a factor of 30 ─even manufacturing, with its 
usually high relative levels of productivity, ends up just above services and 
construction, and as a fraction of mining.  
                                          
9  Krugman (1994).  
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FIGURE 5 
 
● mf=manufacturing; serv&const=services and construction.  3-year moving averages.  
● Source: GGDC (2018).  Comparable data only available until 2010.  For manufacturing 
during the whole period, see below.   
 
As the mineral extractive sector refused to industrialise, its productivity growth 
─after growing at 11% p.a.─, hit an “extractive ceiling”.  Only agriculture, with its 
greater potential for horizontal export-diversification, could still deliver a healthy 
productivity growth post-1990s (6.6% p.a.).  Meanwhile, services and 
construction continued their rapid employment expansion (3.5% p.a.), but could 
only deliver productivity growth at 1.9% p.a.  
Consequently, Chile’s economy even began to lose its post-1986 
“comparative advantage” within Latin America: how to extract more GDP growth 
from (what I shall call) its “purely-extractive dual-economy model”, or PE-DE.  
And this “convergence” (Figure 6) happened despite political instability and poor 
economic performance elsewhere.  
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FIGURE 6 
 
● The rest of Latin America not only excludes Chile, but also Venezuela due to unreliable 
data. 
● Source: GGDC (2019).  
 
This would suggest that a self-satisfied élite that likes to believe that Chile is like 
a good house in a bad neighbourhood is suffering some delusional grandiosity.  
 
2.4.- “Total factor productivity” (TFP) and the Chilean economy  
Inevitably, some are wondering whether the (by now fairly obsolete) neo-classical 
concept of TFP indicates a similar up-and-down picture since the mid-1980s.  And 
so it does (Figure 7), except that the downturn starts even earlier (mid-1990s).  
It also suggests that the “super-cycle” and the easy access to finance became 
wasted opportunities. 
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FIGURE 7 
 
● 3-year moving averages.  
● Source: FRED (2019).   
 
2.5.- The potential and limitations of natural resources as engines 
of productivity growth if they get stuck in purely extractive 
activities. On “Aborted catching-ups” 
Figure 8 shows the two facets of a purely extractive export sector.  From the mid-
1980s recovery onwards, it was agriculture (i.e., forestry, fish-farming, fruit and 
vegetables) that led the “catching-up”.  Mining did so only from the mid-1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12
FIGURE 8 
 
● agr=agriculture; mf=manufacturing; min=mining; and ser=services.  Each line is an 
index number (1980=100) of the ratio of labour productivities between Chile and the US 
(each in real terms and domestic currencies).  An increase implies that Chile is “catching 
up”, and a decline that it is falling behind.  3-year moving averages.  
● Source: GGDC (2018; data available until 2012).    
 
The key question here, of course, is why each process of rapid commodity-
“catching-up” plateaued ─and then even began to reverse.  Part of the answer is 
relatively straightforward: when these activities had reached international levels 
of competitiveness, their demanding “catching-up” period, with their rapid 
productivity growth requirements, was basically over.  From then onwards, these 
extractive sectors just aimed at increasing output while keeping competitive.10  
Instead, what was necessary to sustain the productivity growth drive was to 
switch towards higher value-added activities, while fostering all the associated 
industries.  However, this was clearly not the priority of the corporations (foreign 
or domestic) involved in the sector ─and for reasons that had little to do with 
production efficiencies, and a lot with trade distortions, such as China’s trade 
policies incentivising imports of commodities as unrefined as possible.11  And 
                                          
10  According to Bloomberg, the salmon-farming industry, for example, has struggled to 
maintain quality while increasing quantity.  While output doubled over the last decade (to 
US$5 billion), it used 1,400 times more antibiotics than Norway for a similar output 
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-01/bain-capital-s-patagonia-fishery-
rigs-data-and-sparks-a-crisis).  And one producer that claimed to buck this trend was 
doctoring its statistics (Ibid.).  So, local salmon farmers gained a reputation of “…cowboys 
of sorts who play fast and loose with rules” (Ibid.).  The problem is little fear of 
prosecution ─if convicted, instead of going to prison one may just be sent back to 
university…  A judge recently sent corporate executives convicted of a major tax fraud on 
a course in corporate ethics ─on condition they got a passing grade! 
11  China is the only country that wants Chilean walnuts in their shell, Argentinean soya as 
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governments were not prepared to do anything about it ─even if it was just to 
stop the unnecessary pollution created by transporting more bulky products.12   
What is remarkable here is the contrast between how successive centre-
left governments were quite happy to “interfere” in the market to help the early 
development of purely extractive activities (such as fish farming and forestry) 
─and with shamelessly “vertical” policies─, but were totally reluctant to do the 
same when it came to their industrial processing.13  As discussed below, it seems 
that the “new left” have never been able to unshackle itself from its ghosts from 
the past!  Thus, when it comes to adding manufacturing value to commodities, or 
to regulate the huge environmental damage of extractive activities (e.g., 
forestry), or to control the basic quality of primary production (e.g., fish farming), 
they suddenly turn into strict “free-marketeers”.   
The other related phenomenon in Figure 8 is the poor performance of 
manufacturing, the sector that fell further behind (even more vis-à-vis emerging 
Asia; Section 2.6 below) ─something common to all Latin America (even NAFTA’s 
Mexico).  
However, in Chile “aborted catching-ups” are not new.  During ISI, 
manufacturing also reached a “catching-up plateau”, and got stuck there (Figure 
9).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
beans, heavy-oil unrefined, and so on. 
12  Over a thousand cargo ships sail each year from Chile with copper concentrates; but as 
this product only has about 30% of the mineral, the equivalent of at least 700 of those 
ships sail with just slag.  In fact, by volume, this slag is Chile’s largest export product!  
And this bizarre pollution is Chile’s most easily avoidable contribution to climate change.  
All it would take to stop this would be a higher royalty for the exports of concentrates than 
for refined copper, forcing their smelting in Chile.  
13  For an analysis of how successive governments became key actors in the early stages 
of some extractive activities, see Lebdioui (2019).  The first “vertical” subsidy in the new 
PE-DE model was implemented by Pinochet’s last finance minister on forestry, but that was 
more an incentive for reforestation to stop soil erosion due to the indiscriminate cutting of 
native forests ─some containing trees hundreds and thousands of years old (including 
alerce and araucaria). 
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FIGURE 9 
 
● As Figure 8, and com=commodities.  3-year moving averages.  
● Source: GGDC (2018).  
 
Do these two events reflect similar dynamics, as opposed to mere coincidence?  
There is an underlying common phenomenon: the inability of (distorted) markets, 
(rentier) entrepreneurs and (captured) governments to force the “upgrade”.  As 
the PE-DE model got stuck in its purely extractive activities, ISI also proved 
unable to move beyond its “close-economy” model into its next ─more specialised 
and open─ stage.  Countries fall into this “middle-income trap” by thinking that 
the way to transit from middle to high-income status is by doing “more of the 
same”, hopefully better ─or in neighbouring countries…   
And the more advanced emerging Asia (e.g., South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) was teaching us at the time how to avoid this “ISI-catching-up trap”: 
target subsidies to specific sectors in a performance-related way (including export 
targets); start opening up manufacturing; and rationalise state-owned 
corporations.14  However, the perpetual “neophobia” of the Latin American 
oligarchies ─i.e., their fear of anything new, including that of a break from 
routine─ prevailed.  And this fear-of-the-new led to a similar type of policy-
rigidity afterwards, as it was then also transmitted to the “new-left” ideology. 
 
2.6.-  Manufacturing: the elephant in the room. The “non-creative 
destruction” of a former engine of growth. 
Perhaps nothing reveals the “reverse-gear” attitude of neo-liberal reforms in Latin 
America better than what happened in manufacturing.  This is best summarised 
by the President of Brazil’s Central Bank: when asked about the purpose of 
                                          
14  Pérez (2002).  
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Cardoso’s neo-liberal reforms, he replied: “to undo forty years of stupidity”. (Veja 
15/11/96).  In Chile, an identical attitude is found earlier in “The Brick”, a 
Chicago Boys’ publication calling for exactly the same: the complete reversal of 
ISI ─i.e., to multiply all policies by minus-1.15  Hardly likely that the most 
appropriate development strategy, and related economic policies, could have had 
as simple guiding principles; also, only pretty unimaginative ideologies need to 
demonise everything that has happened before in order to romanticise its 
propositions!  
This unsophisticated ideological discourse neatly reflects the rigidity with 
which the reforms were implemented in the region, and their poor outcome ─in 
terms of productivity growth, for example, the average for Latin America (even 
excluding Venezuela) collapse from 2.8% p.a. between 1950 and 1980, to just 
0.2% between then and 2018.  In fact, in countries such as Brazil and Mexico ISI 
had delivered some of the fastest growth-rates in the world ─in Brazil, 6.8% p.a. 
for 1950-80, multiplying its GDP by more than seven-fold (and Costa Rica by 6.6, 
Mexico by 6.4, the Dominican Republic by 5.6, and Ecuador by 5.2).16  Only a 
Latin-version of a Taliban could have labelled these years as “years of stupidity”; 
of course as Brazil failed to “upgrade” its ISI in the 1970s, this development 
strategy then became counterproductive, but that is another matter.17   
And the Dark-Ages-style attitude to “undo forty years of stupidity” hit 
manufacturing particularly badly; Brazil’s manufacturing growth-rate decelerated 
faster than in any other country in the world ─from 8.2% (1950-80, when output 
increased ten-fold), to less than 1% since.  How different from emerging Asia, 
where early reforms were implemented not to mechanically reverse but to 
strengthen existing ambitious industrialisation strategies, and to help them adapt 
to the new technological paradigm and world order.  In Latin America, instead, 
the not very original “reverse-gear”-style neo-liberal discourse resembled a 
compass whose “magnetic north” had simply switched to the South Pole ─leading 
to a “non-creative destruction” of the ISI manufacturing.  Meanwhile, emerging 
Asia forged ahead. 
This new Latin American development strategy also delivered odd political 
settlements, characterised by a combination of an insatiable capitalist élite, a 
captured progressive intelligentsia, passive citizens, and a stalled social 
imagination (spellbound with the  “absolute certainties” of the new hegemonic 
ideology).  
As suggested, some deep re-engineering of ISI was of course essential, as 
many of its policies had run their course ─and a new technological paradigm and 
world economy were creating totally new challenges.  But it was pretty unlikely 
that such a crude guiding principle as that in Chicago Boys’ Chile could be the 
answer: what was “virtue” suddenly became “vice”, and “vice” became “virtue”.  
Furthermore, it is even less likely that what was supposedly appropriate for Chile 
in the 1970s would be still so nearly half a century afterwards, when almost 
everything has changed in the world economy.   
As in Brazil, the consequences in Chile of this rigid ideology are nowhere 
more obvious than in what happened to manufacturing (Figure 10). 
 
 
 
                                          
15  CEP (1992).  
16  GGDC (2019).   
17  The average for non-Brazil Latin America was also much faster between 1950 and 1980 
than since then ─5% p.a. vs. 2.6%. 
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FIGURE 10 
 
● As Figure 9.  Mining is not included as there is little of it in South Korea.  3-year moving 
averages.  
● Source: GGDC (2018).   
 
Figure 10 helps unravel the puzzle shown in Figure 1: Chile and South Korea’s 
contrasting “catching-ups”.  Other than in manufacturing ─where Chile falls as in 
a roller-coaster (South Korea’s productivity growth trebles Chile’s)─ their sectoral 
performances have not been as strikingly different.  This neglect of manufacturing 
is the key retarding factor in Chile’s “catching-up” ─as well as of its lack of 
economic diversification towards more knowledge-intensive activities.  South 
Korea not only grew faster (6% vs. 4.2% for 1980-2018), but also more than 
two-thirds of that (faster) growth was due to increase in productivity; in Chile it 
was the other way round, with about two-thirds due to employment and only 
one-third to productivity.  The new PE-DE development strategy had no 
manufacturing agenda ─mostly due to its reluctance to industrialise commodities.  
Hence my labelling in 2005 to what happened to manufacturing as “premature 
de-industrialisation”: one that obstructed its transition towards a more mature 
and self-sustained stage in a Kaldorian sense ─i.e., able to trigger processes of 
cumulative causation, characterized by their positive feedback 'loops' into the 
system, capable of self-perpetuating growth.18  
A recent study by McKinsey (2019a and b) examined 71 developing 
economies and singled out 18 of them for consistently posting robust GDP growth 
─and not one of them came from Latin America─, with all “long-term 
outperformers” located in emerging-Asia.  And in outperforming countries,  
                                          
18  See, in particular, Kaldor (1967).  For “premature de-industrialisation”, see Palma 
(2005), and (2008).  For an equivalent concept, developed a decade later, see Rodrik 
(2015). 
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more than two-thirds of the GDP growth over the past 30 years is attributable to a 
rapid rise in productivity correlated with industrialization: an annual average 
productivity gain of 4.1 percent versus 0.8 percent for the other developing 
economies. (Ibid.)   
 
Ever since the industrial revolution, manufacturing has been the path from 
poverty to plenty; neo-liberals tried to reinvent the wheel, but to no avail.  In 
Chile, everyone gets exited every time someone succeeds in developing a new 
“emprendimiento” in the service sector, but no country has broken the “middle-
income trap” by having someone else do the shopping for them.19   
 
2.7.-  The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and Chile’s lack of 
economic diversification  
The ECI, elaborated by The Observatory of Economic Complexity at the MIT Media 
Lab, contains information about the diversity of a country's exports and their 
sophistication.20  This index measures the knowledge intensity of an economy by 
measuring that of its exports.  A low value relative to GDP pc, as in Chile, 
indicates that exports are not very sophisticated ─i.e., they lack knowledge 
intensity.  This index shows how Chile’s purely extractive export sector is limited 
even by unimpressive Latin American standards (Figure 11). 
FIGURE 11 
 
● LA=Latin America; EA=Emerging Asia; NR-HY=natural resource high-income; and 
N=Finland and Sweden.  au=Australia; bg=Bangladesh; bw=Botswana; ca=Canada; 
ch=Switzerland; ci= Côte d’Ivoire; cm=Cameroon; co=Colombia; cr=Costa Rica; 
dr=Dominican Republic; et=Ethiopia; fn=Finland; fr=France; ge=Germany; ir=Ireland; 
                                          
19  C. Palma (2019).  
20  See ECI (2019).  
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is=Israel; it=Italy; jp=Japan; ke=Kenya; mw=Malawi; mz=Mozambique; na= Namibia; 
ne=Netherlands, ni=Nigeria; no=Norway; nz=New Zealand; pe=Peru; pk=Pakistan; 
pr=Paraguay; sw=Sweden; th=Thailand; tr=Turkey; tz=Tanzania; uk=United Kingdom; 
us=United States; ur=Uruguay; za=South Africa; zm=Zambia; and zw=Zimbabwe.  
Otherwise, as above.  The R2 of the regression is 58%, and all the parameters are 
significant at the 1% level.21  
● Source: ECI (2019).  
 
The paradox of Chile’s better regional performance post-1982 is that it took place 
despite exporting less sophisticated products given its GDP pc.  Perhaps this can 
have a double-edged effect on growth, which may well be associated with Chile’s 
two cycles since the mid-1980s.  The relative simplicity of its exports (given its 
GDP pc) may have well helped its post-1986 recovery, but after achieving 
international competitiveness in purely extractive activities their lack of 
knowledge intensity became a drag for further productivity growth.  
At the same time, this is associated with the embarrassing levels of 
expenditure on R&D: just 0.36% of GDP ─and only about one-third of that is 
done by the private sector!22  In South Korea and Israel the figure is 4.3%, and 
about 80% of that is done by the private sector ─i.e., 0.1% of GDP vs. 3.3%.  In 
fact, Chile’s R&D-GDP ratio today is similar to 1960s’ South Korea ─i.e., before its 
industrialisation.23  And in dollar terms, Chile spends today less than 2% of what 
South Korea does in this respect: US$1.4 billions vs. US$84 billions.24  Chile also 
spends well below its peers ─the average for R&D among upper middle income 
countries is 1.8% of GDP.  It actually spends less than half the not very 
impressive Latin American average (0.9%), and (again, relative to its GDP) even 
less than Ethiopia (0.6%) or Sub-Saharan Africa (0.5% on average).  And as the 
poverty of the current neo-liberal ideology seems to know no bounds, all what the 
current government can think of about R&D is to give more tax “incentives”.25  
Basically, and contrary to what our hegemonic economic ideology 
preaches, expenditure on R&D does not follow “opportunities”, but “necessities”.  
That is, given its unambitious development strategy, Chile’s actual R&D 
requirements may well be not that far from its current bizarre levels of R&D.  And 
this, of course, leads to a vicious circle, as the only way to learn how to innovate 
is by innovating…   
 
2.8.-  The uneven performance of investment  
In Chile, investment has followed four distinct cycles since the beginning of the 
neo-liberal reforms (Figure 12).  
 
 
                                          
21  It is important to emphasise that this regression is simply a cross-sectional description 
of cross-country differences in economic complexity, categorised by GDP pc.  That is, it 
should not be interpreted in a “predicting” sense, because there are a number of 
difficulties with a curve estimated from a single cross-section ─especially regarding the 
homogeneity restrictions that are required to hold (see Pesaran et al., 2000). 
22  OECD (2019).  
23  WDI (2019). 
24  Ibid.; and OECD (2019).  
25  See https://www.df.cl/noticias/economia-y-politica/pais/fontaine-en-innovacion-
estamos-revisando-el-incentivo-tributario-a-i-d-a-las-empresas/2019-09-
12/190843.html?utm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Titulares_1309
2019&utm_content=Link_Nota&utm_mc=e7f7c38ea7ecaecdef811445f9116dab.   
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FIGURE 12 
 
● Acronyms as above, and ec=Ecuador.  For Chile, a=1973 Coup d'état, b=1982-crisis; 
c=end of the 1986-1998 growth-cycle; and d=beginning of the “super-cycle” of 
commodity prices.  5-year moving averages.  
● Source: WDI (2019).  
 
The first cycle ─from “a” to “b”─ took place during the initial decade of the 
reforms, when investment continued with its previous mediocre performance.  
Then, after the 1982 collapse and the change of actors both in policymaking and 
in the capitalist élite, investment surged from “b” to “c”.  This second cycle was 
also associated with the rapid “catching-up” of commodity-extractive exports 
(Figure 8).  
And as Díaz-Alejandro suggested, the success of any given set of policies 
also depends on their degree of support ─often this can be more relevant than 
their internal logic!26  In this case, the decision of the democratic opposition to 
Pinochet not to challenge the PE-DE development strategy during the 1988 
plebiscite (so as to transform it into a plebiscite about democracy and human 
rights, rather than about the economic model, as Pinochet had wanted), not only 
helped them win the plebiscite but also helped push the rate of investment 
towards unprecedented heights.  However, as often happens with ideologies, 
although this improvised support for the model was a matter of “urgent 
necessities” (to win this most important of plebiscites), in no time it got 
transformed into policy, then into strategy, and finally into ideology.   
Although this growing support of successive centre-left governments for 
the PE-DE model did help sustain the investment drive until the mid-1990s, it 
increasingly also removed their capacity for critical thinking as the “new left” ─by 
still fighting its ghosts from the past─ was particularly vulnerable to 
                                          
26  See Diaz-Alejandro (1989).    
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“neophobia”.27  This growing fear of breaking from routine was a crucial factor in 
the 1990s’ “catching-up” coming to an end at the end of that decade, leading to 
the third cycle of investment (from “c” to “d”).  Finally, investment did recover 
during the “super-cycle” of commodity prices (especially in extractive mining), 
but this new lease of life proved short-lived and investment ended this period on 
a new declining path.  In the meantime, consumption grew from 65% of GDP in 
2006/7, to 76% at the end of the “super-cycle” (2014) ─populism in motion, 
particularly during the 2010-2014 presidential term.28   
A more positive picture for the period of the “super-cycle” of commodity 
prices emerges when investment is measured “per worker” (as opposed to as 
share of GDP; Figure 13).  
FIGURE 13 
 
● Acronyms as above.  
● Source: WDI (2019), and GGDC (2019).  
 
This statistic helps us understand the reluctance of Chile’s oligarchy to get 
involved in the processing of commodities.  Even though investment per worker 
increased during the first extractive cycle, and then again with commodity prices, 
and Chile ended up in 2018 ahead of the region ─at about US$7,000 per worker─, 
the figure indicates how far this level still is from countries that have embarked 
on these activities successfully (top right-hand side of the figure).  In fact, these 
countries have increased their investment per worker to a level three to four 
times higher than Chile ─in one case, more than five times. And these levels are 
even higher than those of advanced emerging Asian countries, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan or Singapore, which concentrated their industrialisation on 
knowledge-intensive ─and “knowledge-spillover”-intensive─ products.  
                                          
27  In politics, as in the Hotel California, “some dance to remember, some dance to forget”. 
28  WDI (2019).  See also BC (2019).  
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The industrialisation of commodities may not be the most sophisticated 
form of manufacturing, but it seems to be one of the most capital-intensive.  And 
as all the rents of natural resources are captured at the extractive side of the 
business, and since markets for industrialised commodities tend to be more 
competitive than for other manufacturing activities (their output tends to be more 
homogenous), there are few rents to be captured there either.  So, other than 
operating profits, rents associated to innovation seem to be the only ones on 
offer ─not Chile’s forte.  
Figure 13 also shows the poor investment performance of Latin America, 
with the current level of investment per worker in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
even below than that of 1980 (as it has been throughout the post-reform period).  
Perhaps Chile’s better GDP performance since the mid-1980s should not come as 
surprise ─except that Chile’s post-1998 “growth-convergence” (Figure 6 above) 
indicates some eventual “diminishing returns” on investment in its purely 
extractive cycle.  
And while on average Latin America’s post-1980 investment per worker 
remained stagnant, South Korea’s increased by a factor of 5 ─and India by 8, and 
China by above 20 (and according to some sources by nearly 30) –perhaps one 
can have too much of a good thing!  
Finally, Figure 14 reminds us that the two main (although aborted) growth 
experiences in Latin America since the end of the Second Word War ─Brazil pre-
1980, and Chile post-1986─ were precisely characterised by their capacity to 
increase their levels of investment per worker significantly.  However, both were 
also characterised by an inability to sustain these investment drives ─leading to a 
collapse in productivity growth.  
FIGURE 14 
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● Sources: for productivity and employment, GGDC (2019); for investment, WDI (2019). 
 
Another issue that emerges from this figure is that the last period in each country 
has a similar rate of growth of investment per worker than the first one, but this 
is associated with a much lower rate of productivity growth.  There are of course 
many issues involved in this contrast (including the fact that they take place 
within different technological paradigms and world order), but one of them is the 
composition of output: a significant amount of that earlier investment took place 
in manufacturing.  
 
2.9.- The growth of employment ─and the uncomfortable role of 
inequality. 
As already suggested, one of the key characteristics of Latin American economies 
since 1980 is their remarkable capacity to generate employment ─Figure 15 
shows this “per unit of GDP growth” (what could be loosely called their “gross 
employment elasticity”).   
FIGURE 15 
 
● Gross employment elasticity=ratio of employment to GDP growth.  In this figure some 
acronyms are different due to space constraints on the horizontal axis.  a=Argentina; 
b=Bolivia; B=Brazil; c=Colombia; d=Dominican Republic; e=Ecuador; g=Guatemala; 
h=Hong-Kong;, j=Japan; k=South Korea; m=México; p=Peru; t=Thailand; u=Uruguay; 
and v=Vietnam.  Otherwise, as above; and eu=European Union; and ve=Venezuela. 
● Sources: For growth, WDI (2019); for Taiwan (Taiwan, 2019).  For employment, GGDC 
(2019), and  ILO (2019).  
 
While in the rest of the world countries struggle to attain a “gross” employment 
elasticity of 0.5, the Latin American average is close to 1.  As suggested above, in 
Chile this results from the huge capacity of services and construction to generate 
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employment ─sectors with a rate of employment growth three times faster than 
population growth.29  The rest of the region presents a relatively similar picture.  
Figure 16 helps understand this Latin American phenomenon, indicating an 
“inverted-U”-type relationship between inequality and employment growth across 
middle-income countries.  
FIGURE 16 
 
● Acronyms as above, and id=Indonesia.   
● Sources: For employment, GGDC (2019); and for inequality, WDI (2019), and Palma 
(2019a). 
 
In employment creation there seems to be a rather perverse “optimal” level of 
inequality in middle-income countries.  And Latin America seems to be right on 
that spot ─one in which high inequality provides the necessary supply of cheap 
labour, and middle levels of income the demand for services and construction.30  
Meanwhile, in middle-income Southern Africa, although inequality is much higher 
and cheap labour is more abundant, obscene inequality means that its squeezed 
middle and upper-middle don’t have enough income to buy services or a place to 
live ─no matter how relatively cheap those may be (thanks to the overabundance 
of cheap labour).  In these countries, only high-income groups can afford 
services, so that now in South Africa there are more people employed in security 
alone than in the whole of manufacturing.31  
In turn, in high-GDP-growth/ lower-inequality emerging Asia, average 
employment growth is only about half that of Latin America ─although, obviously, 
this is so for more reasons than lower inequality.  In fact, in Asia productivity 
growth between 2000 and 2015 was responsible for 86% of (a rather fast rate of) 
                                          
29  On employment, see INE (2019); on cheap labour, Durán and Kremerman (2018).  
30  Palma (2019a).  
31  Ibid.  
 24
GDP growth, while in Latin America it accounts for just 22% (of its fairly mediocre 
GDP growth) ─with its employment growth contributing the other 78%.32   
The problem with this Latin American capacity to create a lot of (low-
productivity, and low productivity growth potential) employment, as happened in 
Chile at the turn of the millennium, is what do you do when you begin to run out 
of cheap labour?  As services and construction were creating employment at more 
than twice the rate of population growth, it was only a matter of time before 
these sectors began to encounter an increasing scarcity of its main input: cheap 
labour.  And when this happened at the start of the new millennium, the labour 
market began to change from the old-fashion institution in which low-wage 
workers have to compete desperately for employers, into a new one in which 
employers have to start competing for cheap labour!  And higher-income 
households as well as producers were not used to this ─and they didn’t like it at 
all!  
In this new (and more civilised) labour market, there was not only an 
inevitable ─and “market-led”─ upward pressure on wages and improved working 
conditions, but it also created “necessities” (or compulsions) for productivity 
growth and investment.  So, some of the well-established foundations of Latin-
style economics and politics began to be shaken.  And, predictably, it was a “new-
left” government that began to take action to reverse these progressive 
transformations (see below). 
Michael Kalecki (1943) had warned us about capitalism struggling 
politically with a sustained period of full employment ─i.e., with no “reserve 
army” of unemployed as its safety net.  This is even truer in unequal middle-
income countries, as full-employment could trigger transformations with which 
rigid institutions and “neophobic” rent-seeking oligarchies would struggle to cope.  
Capitalism could then resemble an overheating power plant whose usual “escape 
valves” have been disconnected… 
 
2.10.-  Chile’s (and Latin America’s) neo-liberal development 
strategy from the perspective of the world economy  
Figure 17 organises countries according to productivity and employment growth.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
32  See McKinsey (2019b). 
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FIGURE 17 
 
● Acronyms as above, and EE=Eastern Europe; N1=South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; 
N2=Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand; ru=Russia; ve*=Venezuela (average productivity 
growth=-2.3).  
● Source: GGDC (2019).  Sub-Saharan Africa is excluded, as their employment statistics 
are just econometric guesstimates from population data. 
 
From this perspective, the global average (black circle in the figure) identifies four 
quadrants.  In “1” are those countries whose productivity and employment 
growth since 1980 are below average ─and almost all of them are so-called 
developed (geriatric?) countries.  In turn, quadrant “2” is populated entirely by 
Latin America, countries able to generate employment growth well above the 
world average, but little or no productivity growth.  In fact, on average a Latin 
American worker produces today almost the same output as he or she did in 
1980 (just 8% more in all) ─equivalent to an average annual rate of growth of 
0.2%!33  It is difficult to imagine a more unsuccessful development strategy than 
the post-1980s neo-liberal one, especially in the rigid and corrupt way it was 
implemented in Latin America.  One of my hypotheses is that despite 
appearances, it never really got over its “original sin”: the way in which it was 
brought about by its “Magnificent Seven”, the visionary leaders who selflessly 
pioneered them.  Ever since, most business practices are like Salinas’s, their 
aesthetics like Menem’s, attachments to democracy like Fujimori’s, ideological 
sophistication like Collor’s, fiscal earnestness (with few exceptions) like Pérez’s, 
mental health like Bucaram’s, and respect for human rights (although in a more 
disguised way) often resembling Pinochet’s.  Perhaps what characterises neo-
liberal Chile is the contrast between its dark-ages beginnings and its more 
civilised post-1990 ─although surely the gap between the degree of “self-
                                          
33  GGDC (2019).  
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satisfaction” of its economic and political élites and reality is the greatest in the 
region.  
In terms of Figure 17, although Chile’s employment growth is similar to 
the region’s average, its productivity growth is higher ─but still below the global 
average.  In turn, emerging Asian countries monopolise quadrant “3”, with China 
at its edge in employment creation, including those from its first wave of 
industrialisation (N1: South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), its second (N2: 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand), and its third (China, India and Vietnam).  In 
fact, these are the only countries in the world able to generate simultaneously 
high levels of productivity and employment growth ─walking and chewing gum at 
the same time.   
Finally, Figure 18 shows what I like to call “the Latin American syndrome”: 
whenever a country like Chile does eventually manage to move from quadrant “2” 
to “3”, this turns out to be a temporary state of affairs.  That’s the real difference 
between Latin America and emerging Asia: although both are able to achieve high 
rates of productivity growth, only emerging Asia knows how to sustain them long-
term.  That’s the difference between middle-distance runners and marathon ones!   
FIGURE 18 
 
● For Chile, cl1=1980-1986; ch2=1986-1998; and ch3=1998-2018.  Acronyms as above.  
● Source: GGDC (2019).   
 
The key message of Figure 18 is that Latin America seems to be cursed with a 
particularly strong “gravitational pull” towards quadrant “2”.  Every time a 
country manages to shift gear and move from quadrant ”2” to “3”, sooner rather 
than later it returns home to “2”.  Whereas, when an emerging Asian country 
moves to “3”, it remains there.  In Latin America one finds middle-distance 
runners at best, like Chile between 1986 and 1998 ─i.e., countries that speed up, 
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but before long, they run out of oxygen and have to slow down again 
productivity-wise.  
Emerging Asia’s capacity to “upgrade” when a development strategy has 
run its course has a lot to do with that stamina.  For example, South Korea 
opened up early its ISI to transform it in an export-oriented industrialisation; 
Taiwan “governed the markets” for this; and China quickly turned the tables on 
the European Union and the US.34  An essential component of this is the capacity 
to confront “sell-by dates” properly.  Trying artificially to extend the “shelf-life” of 
a development strategy ─as Chile did with ISI in the 1960s, and as it is trying to 
do again now (diversifying horizontally abroad, and bringing in immigrant cheap 
labour) is a recipe for remaining in quadrant “2”.   
As is well known, Korea received strong advice against its new 
industrialising project from the Washington Consensus −as a Governor of the 
Bank of Korea reminds us, when they wanted to industrialise, they said: "you 
don't have the comparative advantage for that".35  In fact, several World Bank 
documents wondered what the point was of transforming first-rate iron into 
second-rate steel, or (even worse) this into third-rate cars.  However, it was not 
long before Korean cars (like their Japanese counterparts) became as common in 
world markets as Scottish whiskey, Norwegian salmon, or French wine.36  In fact, 
as the above-quoted South Korean official said, their real comparative advantage 
was that “…we did everything we wanted but whatever we did, we did it well”.    
Also, as new income distribution theory teaches us, low levels of inequality 
are only sustainable when they are anchored in productive structures ─such as 
those of Korea and Taiwan─, while those that rely increasingly on taxes and 
transfers, as in Europe (East and West), are increasingly like a boat taking on 
water.37  
Foucault’s (1979) understanding of the relationship between power and 
knowledge, in particular the role of the economic “discipline” in democracy ─as a 
form of “disciplinary” power via the production of particular kinds of knowledge─, 
could be of great help in this area.  From his standpoint, what we really need in 
Latin America is a more critical perspective within economics on the range of our 
options for participation.  
Saint Augustine argued that our free will has been weakened but not 
destroyed by original sin.  Perhaps in Latin America it had a more devastating 
effect.   
 
3.- Theory 
Following Section 2, and as already suggested, the main hypothesis informing the 
answer to the questions set in the Introduction is that by the turn of the 
millennium the development strategy implemented after the 1973 Coup d'état 
(and redefined after the 1982 financial crisis, and then again, but minimally, in 
1990 with the return to democracy), had run its course ─i.e., their productivity 
                                          
34  On Taiwan, see Wade (2002).  According to a Financial Times columnist, “Germany 
once saw China as an export market for machinery with which China would develop its 
industrial base. Today, China is becoming the senior partner in the relationship. 
[Germany’s] biggest problem is falling behind in the technological race. … [This] is 
symptomatic of a fundamental European problem. … [Now there] are signs that 
complacency is about to turn into panic”. (Münchau, 2018) 
35  Quoted in Wade (1992).  
36  Chang (2002).  
37  Palma (2019a).  
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drives had fizzled out─, and it was in desperate need of a full “upgrade”.  The 
same can be said of the neo-liberal ideology at its foundations. 
By this “upgrade” I mean one capable of generating new engines of 
productivity growth ─e.g., the industrialisation of commodities, a “green new 
deal”, or the spread of the new technological paradigm into the whole economy─, 
characterized by their positive feedback loops into the system, and capable of 
generating a “cumulative causation-type momentum” of change, which could 
become self-perpetuating ─in the Veblen/Myrdal or the Smith/Young/Kaldor 
perspective.  It would still be capitalism, warts and all, but at least a capitalism 
capable of developing the productive forces of society in a sustainable way.   
However, neither highly distorted “markets” nor centre-left or right-wing 
governments have had much of a clue as to how to bring this about ─let alone 
the nerve to do it.  
In the initial period (1974-82), the government pursued a simple dual 
path.  First, as the Latin American élite has always believed that it has some sort 
of divine right over natural resources (a modern version of the Droit du seigneur, 
as it were), the government hosted a rough and ready “piñata” of natural 
resources.  Then it tried to fuel demand in the domestic economy encouraging a 
credit-led consumption and speculative drive, while simultaneously having 
another “piñata”-style privatisation of the large state-owned corporate sector.38   
However, by the early 1980s the latter had had little impact on investment 
or productivity growth, and the runaway consumption and asset-price booms had 
created such indebtedness and excess private expenditure that Chile became the 
most exposed economy in the whole of Latin America to a sudden halt of 
inflows.39  When Mexico defaulted in mid-1982, Chile’s GDP crashed by more than 
20% between its pre-crisis peak and the third quarter of 1983; unemployment 
jumped to over 30%, and more than half of the population ended up below the 
poverty line.40  The direct fiscal cost of this self-made mess alone was equivalent 
to more than 40% of GDP. 
In fact, Chile’s income per capita the year after Sergio de Castro received 
his dishonourable discharge as Pinochet’s Finance Minister was actually lower 
than the year before he started his seven-year period as economic tsar ─proving 
once again that arrogance is no substitute for knowledge.  
However, the recovery following the change of guard in the economic 
team and in the capitalist élite, and the radical change of policy that followed 
(including a huge devaluation, a new pro-growth macro that included a Kaldorian 
pro-investment component,41 and the above mentioned (vertical) interventions in 
some extractive export activities) was also the most dynamic.  Furthermore, 
helped in part by an unusual transition to democracy, the economy managed to 
sustain the speed gathered from this recovery for most of the 1990s.  
But towards the turn of the millennium, the two key growth-drivers of this 
1986-1998 dynamic cycle ─the extraction of natural resources and the recovery 
from the 1982 crash─ began to lose their momentum.  In exports, as extractive 
activities had become internationally competitive, their demanding “catching-up” 
period, with its rapid productivity growth requirements, was basically over.  
Afterwards, it was all about increasing output while trying to sustain already 
                                          
38  On this ransacking of the Chilean State during the early years of the neo-liberal 
reforms, see especially Mönckeberg (2015).  See also Gárate (2012), and Palma (2013). 
39  Palma (2012). 
40  See Bértola and Ocampo (2012); Bulmer-Thomas (2014); and Palma (2012). 
41  See Marcel and Palma (1989); see also https://ciperchile.cl/2014/05/19/%c2%bfto-fut-
or-not-to-fut/.  
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achieved levels of competitiveness.  And in the domestic economy as well, little 
had been done to generate new engines of productivity growth after the drive 
from the post-1982 recovery began to lose its momentum.  
It seems that when things are going well, some policy-makers rediscover 
Newton’s first law of motion ─i.e., with some wishful thinking, they assume that 
as long as the macro-balances are all right, an economy would tend to continue in 
its state of uniform motion simply because it is in motion already.  
Instead, what was needed to sustain the 1990s momentum was to start 
diversifying the economy into more knowledge-intensive activities.  As suggested, 
in exports, this meant moving forward into higher value-added “downstream” and 
“upstream” activities.  However, markets are unlikely to be able to guide resource 
allocation effectively in a dynamic sense in a world so full of distortions and 
market failures ─i.e., when they can be manipulated so easily by large players 
(domestic and foreign).  So, what was required was a bit of Asian-style 
government “disciplining” of the capitalist élite ─and this does not come naturally 
in Latin America, where “disciplining” goes the other way round.   
Another engine of productivity growth could have been a local version of a 
“green new deal”.  Chile is full of potential for renewable energies, and its 
agriculture could be transformed into a profitable (and environmentally-friendly) 
organic industry.  As a recent Bloomberg (2019) reports emphasises, “Turns out 
it’s not just easy being green—it’s also profitable”.  But for this it is necessary to 
rationalise the use of scarce resources, such as water for irrigation ─one of the 
many resources looted at the time of the neo-liberal reforms by the courtiers of 
the military regime, including top government officials.42  And a third front could 
have been helping the spread of the new technological paradigm to the four 
corners of the economy.43 
However, on exports corporations were only interested on extraction, and 
successive governments lacked the imagination and will to do anything about it.  
So, commodity exports began the struggle to maintain their productivity growth 
momentum, as further horizontal diversification had its natural limits.   
On the second and third, although there were some improvements in 
environmental regulation, some belated movement towards renewable energies 
(thermal energy still provides 60% of the country’s electricity, with two-thirds of 
that done using coal), and some minimal attention to technological innovation, 
neither governments nor the private sector ever understood the potential of a 
new green drive or of technological upgrading as new drivers of productivity 
growth.44  In fact, expenditure on R&D still remains at ludicrous levels ─as 
mentioned above, in dollar terms South Korea spends 60 times more than Chile 
in this respect (or about 25 times more in per capita terms).  As “catching-up” is 
also about closing the gap in knowledge, the contrasting fortunes of Chile and 
South Korea in Figure 1 should not come as a surprise.  
As little diversification took place, knowledge-intensity of Chilean exports 
ended up poor even by Latin American standards.  In sum, when the original 
development strategy had lost its thrust the economy was destined for a new 
                                          
42  See footnote 38 above.  On Chile’s growing scarcity of water, see WRI (2019).  
43  See Pérez (2015).  
44  A recent report from the main Chilean business association (The Sociedad de Fomento 
Fabril) even calls for environmental deregulation in several fronts; for example, the 
protection of glaciers is labelled ‘a main drag on mining’ 
(https://www.df.cl/noticias/economia-y-politica/laboral-personas/sofofa-identifica-23-
piedras-en-el-zapato-para-el-crecimiento-del-pais/2019-10-
03/194933.html?utm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Lo+Leido_0410
2019&utm_content=Link_Nota&utm_mc=QvKhKAquPdpnYCEE2N_zoQ). 
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pedestrian cycle; one that could still deliver similarly high employment growth, 
but productivity growth collapsed by three-fourth.  Not even stimuli of the 
commodity-price “super-cycle” magnitude, or from the easy access to cheap 
domestic and foreign finance, were able to inject some productivity dynamism 
into this lethargic economy.45   
What comes to mind here is the (often conveniently forgotten) key neo-
classical theorem of policy-making, that of Lipsey and Lancaster (1957).  In 
essence, an economy is not like a jigsaw puzzle, where if one piece is missing the 
others remain intact.  In the real world, they change as a result, interacting with 
each other differently.  One might find the missing piece, but it will no longer fit.  
To go back to basics, this piece needs to be redesigned, along with all the others!   
So all that is necessary for having to rethink the whole preferred neo-
classical policy package, built on the assumption of an imaginary world free of 
distortions and market failures, is just one missing “Paretian optimal condition” 
─just one distortion, or one market failure is all it takes.  And as we operate in a 
world that is littered with them, an efficient “second-best” policy-package may 
well look radically different from the one instinctively preferred by neo-classical 
economists.  The 1990s Ffrench-Davis/ Zhaler capital controls is a paradigmatic 
case of a move in this direction.46  
In Lipsey and Lancaster’s words (see epigraph): 
The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if …a constraint 
…prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian 
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.  …In other 
words, given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then 
an optimum situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian 
conditions.  (Emphasis added) 
 
It couldn’t be clearer: even from a proper neo-classical point of view, pragmatism 
is what should rule in policy-making.  But in the “Washington Consensus” 
ideology trumped efficiency: if there is a problem, fix it by applying the 
corresponding “first-best” policy.  And as Lipsey (2007) emphasised (when 
reflecting on his theorem fifty years later), this type of policy prescription is 
“…welfare-improving only in the imaginary one-distortion world”.  
The dismay for fundamentalists is that the most efficient “second-best” 
policy package is bound to look starkly different from ideological preferences.  
Ideal governments do not exist either, of course, but this is hardly a reason to 
stick with supposedly “first-best” policies preached by intransigent theorists who 
want to illuminate the real world by inventing false ones.  If imaginative 
piecemeal “second-best” policy advising is an art, neo-liberal first-best ones are a 
soap opera. 
In fact, when (long ago) I was a student of the Chicago Boys, not only was 
the Lipsey and Lancaster neo-classical theorem never mentioned (as the whole 
ideological policy-apparatus would have collapsed), but the very way in which 
they taught us the neo-classical “first-best” policy package reminded me of that 
old-fashioned “ontological argument” for the existence of God: "that than which 
nothing greater can be thought".   
                                          
45  Abundant domestic finance was provided mainly by the privatised pension system; 
while delivering meagre pensions (half of all retirees receiving an old-age pension now get 
less than half a minimum wage), it provides massive amounts of finance to the private 
sector.  Why workers have to subsidise this through their pension contributions is a 
different matter (see CENDA, 2019; and Gálvez and Kremerman, 2019). 
46  See Palma (2012).  
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The core problem of neo-liberal policy-making is that its ideology has 
transformed “means” (i.e., mere economic policies) into “ends”.47  Never mind 
that the resulting (“first-best”) policy package is likely to be utterly inefficient on 
its own terms.  But in an ideology built on “purity of beliefs” pragmatism is 
heresy.  Here the English Puritans come to mind, as they sought to purify the 
Church of England of Roman Catholic practices in the 16th and 17th centuries.  In 
the same mindset (especially in Chile’s version of the Massachusetts Bay Colony), 
early neo-liberals sought to purify economics and policy-making from 
Keynesianism and Lipsey and Lancaster-style neo-classical economics (and also 
form structuralism) ─doctrines that had immersed themselves too much in the 
complexities of the real world.  Neo-liberals (including those in the early 
Washington Consensus) were convinced that if one gives too much emphasis to 
earthly matters, confusion threatens and moral certainty is lost.  As the primal 
split between good and bad had disappeared from economics, the discipline had 
to be saved by enshrining the notion of one by segregating it from the other.  
Their call to arms: no more “second bests”!48  Also, manufacturing, the 
illegitimate offspring of state intervention and protectionism, had to be 
mistrusted. 
In fact, it wouldn’t surprise me if they had even convinced themselves that 
their sense of urgency for grabbing all natural resources and state owned 
enterprises was a necessary step to save these resources and assets from those 
public sector loving renegades in the mould of Keynes, Lipsey and Lancaster, or 
President Balmaceda. 
And in Chile, as the neo-liberal ideology is still overflowing with “absolute 
certainties” (no matter how obvious it may be that they are passé), the economy 
sinks ever deeper in the quicksand of inertia.  If change comes, it is to reinforce 
the “rent-seeking guarantees for the few, capitalism for the rest” type of status-
quo.  For example, a new policy-straightjacket is about to be added in the form of 
the Transpacific Treaty, or TPP-11, where lawyers and lobbyists of multinationals 
were welcome to write the draft of its key chapters.49  They not only made sure 
to deny any future government the policy-space required to move in a “second-
best” direction, but also ─together with strengthening the current inefficient 
system of intellectual property rights50─ they even gave themselves a new (and 
not-very-capitalist) property right over “claimed future profits” ─no matter how 
socially-inefficient they may be.51  
                                          
47  The current debate on tax reforms is a good example.  A government which is 
desperate for additional fiscal revenues to fulfil its very minimal obligations, is happy to 
fight for a more “integrated” tax system even if that would mean a major reduction in its 
tax collection (as the very rich and large corporations would pay even less taxes than they 
do now).  Purity of belief on the “means” (tax-integration) makes “the end” redundant…  
(See Lambeth, Otero and Vergara, 2019; Huenchumilla, 2019; and Grau, 2019).  On how 
the welfare state has been transformed into something resembling a post-modern Robin 
Hood ─one that ‘robs’ the rich to give to the very rich─, see Palma (2019a).  
48  Such as progressive taxation; so the rich and large corporations were welcome to 
rewrite legislation so that what was before considered tax evasion could now become mere 
avoidance.  
49  See Akram (2019), reporting evidence gathered by Senator Latorre’s team.  
50  Intellectual property rights, as currently implemented, are counterproductive as they 
tend to slow down (rather than the speed up) the pace of innovation.  As Knowledge is a 
(global) public good, with no marginal costs associated with its use, restricting its access 
would necessarily cause market inefficiency.  Furthermore, as knowledge is the main input 
for the creation of further knowledge, restricting its use inevitably leads to an oligopolistic 
market for knowledge.  The need to provide incentives to innovate is one thing; artificially 
restricting access to knowledge is quite another (Stiglitz, 2007; and Palma, 2019a).  
51  See, for example, https://www.elmostrador.cl/destacado/2019/06/03/jose-gabriel-
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Furthermore, large corporations also wanted this new “property right” to 
be protected by a new supra-national court, explicitly designed to overrule the 
national court systems ─courts that will have more than a passing resemblance to 
those of the Inquisition, as their key role is to become the new “Defenders of the 
Faith”.  And who better than lawyers in the payroll of multinationals acting as 
judges in these new courts! 
Basically, what the TPP-11 shows (yet again) is that big corporations (and 
their multiple allies, including some new-left converts) haven’t got a clue 
anymore as to what capitalism is really about.  I would argue that this 
phenomenon ended up being the trade-mark of the metamorphosis of the neo-
liberal ideology: from early puritanical beliefs, to a crude recipe for market-
manipulation. 
And this being today’s Chile, the TPP-11 could only be approved in 
Parliament by the support of sections of the “new-left”.  That is (borrowing from 
psychoanalytical ideas), it could only be approved with the help from those that 
find it impossible ─due to previous ideological traumas─ to think for themselves 
and to be themselves at the same time, as if the two were now incompatible.  
Sequential, logical, thought seems to come now from a different place internally 
from where sensations, assumptions, desires and fears come.52  Thinking, in fact, 
is now couched in terms of what should be thought; belief is a matter of 
adherence to new dogmas and not arising from inner convictions; action is not 
prompted by desire but by obedience.   
There are other beliefs, of course; and as long as they do not relate to 
purely economic matters they are allowed to be more than just silent 
assumptions embedded in the imagery of day-dreams or instinctual action.  For 
example, the new left has fought effectively against social conservatism in issues 
such as legalising divorce, legalising abortion in specific circumstances, and then 
some gay rights ─despite massive opposition from all the usual suspects.53  But in 
their economic agenda, they were unable to go beyond the Neolithic neo-liberal 
one: for capitalism to work, one has to keep the rich and large corporations sweet 
(as opposed to “on their toes”, with market compulsions).  Keynes (and President 
Balmaceda) must be spinning in their graves!  In the meantime, emerging Asia 
cannot believe its luck, as this opens innumerable productive opportunities for 
them.  
Another part of the problem is that in the Ibero-American tradition, 
societies are often run by huge state apparatuses of faceless bureaucrats 
prepared to follow passively whatever ideology is the order of the day ─no matter 
how economically inefficient these ideologies may be.  No South Korean, 
Taiwanese or Singaporean (Weberian-type) civil-service here!  In fact, a 
paradigmatic example in Chile of this Ibero-American “faceless bureaucrat 
compliance syndrome” is the way in which the TPP-11 treaty was negotiated by 
the relevant bureaucrats.   
                                                                                                                       
palma-la-ganancia-comercial-de-chile-en-el-tpp-11-es-irrelevante-es-mucho-mas-lo-que-
perdemos/; and 
http://www.elmercurio.com/Inversiones/Noticias/Columnas/2019/06/04/El-TPP11-
garantias-para-mi-capitalismo-para-los-demas.aspx, 
52  On these issues, see Britton (1998).  
53  President Bachelt had a stroke of genius when she presented to parliament the law 
legalising abortion at the same time than a major tax reform, as right-wing parties were 
prepared to look the other way with the former as long as the government made 
significant concessions with the latter.  Thus, she got through the law on abortion, which 
was much closer to her heart than mere mundane economic matters.  
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In Chile’s version of Animal Farm, these faceless bureaucrats play the role 
of the sheep in Orwell’s book.  As Primo Levi emphasises, the truly dangerous 
people are “…the functionaries ready to believe and to act without asking 
questions”.54  
 A related theoretical point here comes from Douglas North’s concept of 
“limited access order”.55   Neo-liberal reforms have consolidated a scenario in 
which élites (domestic and foreign) divide up the control of rents and block the 
access of others.  Now, after the TPP-11, it will be next to impossible to challenge 
these highly inefficient ─and pseudo-capitalist─ rent-seeking modes of 
accumulation.  In fact, the TPP-11 promises to be as effective as Pinochet’s “leyes 
de amarres” (or “tying-up laws”), implemented after he lost his 1988 plebiscite, 
which have strangled any attempt of real change since.  
Another highly-relevant theoretical point is provided by Hirschman (1982).  
If Chile got stuck in its PE-DE model when it had become counterproductive, it is 
not an uncommon phenomenon as people do tend to stick with policies well after 
their shelf-life.  This also happened in its previous ISI-development strategy.  
Hirschman’s syndrome ─the reluctance to confront the “best before” 
phenomenon─ is particularly true when policies had been able to deliver dynamic 
growth at some point in the past (as in Chile 1986-98), as memories of past 
glories tend to stick for much longer than those of downturns.  
One of the by-products of the Hirschman syndrome is the “rebound 
effect”: how sticking with a development strategy well after they had become 
counterproductive leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing 
policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a “bounce-back”.  A 
good example is the neo-liberal one in the 1970s in Chile (and late 1970s and 
early 1980s in the advanced countries, and afterwards in the rest of Latin 
America), where the core of its discourse was simply to reverse as many aspects 
of the post-war development strategy as possible.  I have extended this 
Hirschmanian analysis to explain why inequality moves “in waves”.56   
Why emerging Asia became the exception to Hirschman’s syndrome, able 
to deal with the issue of the “shelf life” of a development strategy in a more 
imaginative way thanks to its “upgrade” flexibilities, remains a great analytical 
challenge in the study of ideology ─as “Confucian revival"-style explanations are 
surely not sufficient.  In Latin America, instead, ideological and institutional 
rigidities, leading to “reverse-gear” reforms, may well have helped create an 
excess supply of “silly-billies”, but this has not helped its catching-up ─as 
paradise for them has becomes a purgatory for the real economy.  Some of these 
“silly-billies” may well have become successful players in ‘spot-markets’ (which is 
not a minor achievement), but when it comes to compete with Asian or other 
producers in the industrial processing of commodities (or any other form of 
industrialisation), they throw in the towel before they’re even into the ring.  In 
fact, with the sole (and only partial) exception of wine, it is difficult to find a 
commodity that is not exported in its most primitive state possible ─and this in a 
development strategy that is not far from its 50th anniversary!  By now, it has 
actually become a phobia of doing anything over and above that. 
There is no better example of this than what has happened with copper in 
Chile.  What should have been done with its rents, especially during the price-
bonanza from 2002 to 2014, is what President Balmaceda did with nitrates in the 
late 1880s.  First, continuing President Santa María’s policy, his royalty reached 
                                          
54  https://newrepublic.com/article/119959/interview-primo-levi-survival-auschwitz. 
55  North et al., 2007.  
56 See Palma (2019a).  
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about one-third of the value of nitrate exports.  No fake royalty then like the 
Lagos and Eyzaguirre one now, which is only equivalent to about 1% of copper 
exports!57  Furthermore, as copper corporations were given tax concessions to 
help them swallow such a supposedly “draconian” measure, the net contribution 
to public finances is even lower.  
Balmaceda’s government then used these resources to quadruple (in real 
terms) public investment in physical capital, as well as to increase expenditure in 
education eight-fold, which resulted in almost half of public expenditure going 
into these two productivity-enhancing areas.58  His government also created the 
Ministry of Public Works and Industry in 1887, endowing it with a rapidly 
expanded budget that was used in part to foster manufacturing.59  
In essence, Balmaceda’s economic policy consisted in capturing the rents 
of natural resources in order to invest them in creating new productive capacities, 
aiming at being able to replace the contribution made by nitrates to the economy 
if either its prices came down, deposits were diminished, or synthetic alternatives 
became commercially viable (as their main constraint was the high cost of 
energy, it was only a matter of time for this to happen).60  Also, substitutes (such 
as ammonium sulphate) could become more popular.  In turn, the investment of 
the royalty’s fiscal contribution was meant to force the economy to change gear 
and help bring Chile out of its sluggish pre-capitalist era.61  
What a contrast with what happened with the processing of natural 
resources ─and the use of their rents─ since the beginning of the neo-liberal era.  
On the former, Chile is actually going backwards: exports of refined or blister 
copper as a percentage of all copper exports have actually declined since the neo-
liberal reforms, from close to 100% to just 44% in 2018.62  And in terms of the 
waste of their rents, according to one study, between 2005 and 2014 alone, the 
equivalent of US$120 billions (in US$2016; the equivalent to almost half its GDP) 
were appropriated ─just in terms of rents, or as the study’s authors call them, 
“gratuitous rents”─ by the top 10 private copper corporations.63  To give an idea 
of this amount, at today’s prices they are equivalent to more than the whole cost 
of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after the Second World War.64  The irony is 
that even according to Chile’s Constitution, “The State has the absolute, 
                                          
57  https://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/articles-195184_Informe_PDF (Table R.1.1).  Moreover, 
the key opposition to a proper royalty comes from the Consejo Minero, an association of 
large producers which includes CODELCO.  That is, in a true ‘magical realist’ spirit, a state-
owned corporation helps finance the anti-royalty lobby.  Latin America at its finest!  García 
Márquez must be smiling in his grave. 
58  When he came to power in 1886, there were about 80,000 pupils at primary and 
secondary level; by the time of the oligarchic revolt, there were twice as many 
(Blackmore, 1974).  
59  Ibid., and Palma (2000).   
60  The Haber-Bosch process to make fertilisers is so energy-intensive that today it is 
responsible for 1% of energy consumption worldwide 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04f77rg).  So, in the fight against global warming 
Chilean nitrates could well have a stage revival.  
61  For example, a huge programme of railway construction forced landowners needing to 
retain workers to start paying them at least part of their wages in cash ─and they didn’t 
like it at all!  This was the beginning of the end of the peonage system (or involuntary 
servitude), and the dawn of a capitalist labour market in agriculture.  On this initial 
transformation of “peons” into “proletarian” ─as well as what happened with public 
expenditure after Balmaceda─ see Palma (2000).   
62  http://www.cochilco.cl:4040/boletin-web/pages/index/index.jsf; and Palma (2009).  
63 See Zerene et al. (2018).  
64 The Marshall Plan cost US$14 billion; adjusting for inflation, this would be equal to about 
US$110 billion today.  
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exclusive, inalienable and imprescriptible domain of all mines” ─a statement not 
worth the paper it was written on.65  
Foreign corporations operating in the copper sector may have had to pay 
significant royalties for similar operations in their home country (e.g. Australia), 
but not in Chile.  Here, five so-called progressive governments since the return to 
democracy have not even attempted to get back the rents from other natural 
resources either, like water, from forestry, and from other many mining rights 
─not even in order to compensate for the huge environmental damage of some of 
these industries.  And the fact that those natural resources were corruptly given 
away for free (like water rights), or nearly for free to the flatterers of the military 
regime, became irrelevant, since the well-known agreement at the time of the 
transition to democracy between the military regime, the Chilean capitalist élite 
and the leadership of the “Concertación” dictated that there would never be an 
investigation of the multiple economic crimes committed during the dictatorship.66 
In fact (other than the negligible revenues from the existing royalty), the 
only copper-rents appropriated by the Chilean state come from the state-owned 
CODELCO; but due to a draconian law left by the Pinochet regime ─which forces 
CODELCO to give the equivalent of 10% of its sales to the armed forces─ little is 
left for building productive capacities (Balmaceda-style).67   
As suggested, there are two main reasons why those involved in the 
Chilean (and Latin American) natural resource sector have been unwilling to 
industrialise.  One is that the rents of natural resources are fully captured in the 
extractive side of the business; from then onwards, any further value added 
consists of industrial processes, often highly capital-intensive and with fairly 
ordinary rates of returns ─except for rents from innovation.  So, those who are 
only interested in acquiring easy rents from “low-hanging-fruit” activities prefer to 
seek further horizontal diversification into new natural resource-extraction (at 
home and abroad).  But this has its natural limits, especially at home.  The other 
is that in the industrial processes that add value to commodities, one inevitably 
has to compete with emerging Asian producers and other successful actors in this 
industry (e.g., the Nordic countries, Australia, Canada and New Zealand).  Life in 
highly rent-rewarding purely extractive activities, “protected” by rich resource 
endowments and tamed states is one thing; having to survive in highly capital-
intensive and competitive industrial activities, with Asian rivals often helped and 
subsidised by industrial and trade policies ─but also hard-pressed by them, as 
government support is routinely tied to performance goals─, is quite another.68  
In this context, perhaps it is not by chance that post-Mao China has been 
entirely run by engineers (with their “let’s get it done” mindset).  In fact, during 
the 1990s and most of the 2000s, eight of the nine top Communist Party leaders 
were engineers or natural scientists, and all of the top leaders on the Standing 
Committee shared an engineering background ─no economist or lawyer need 
apply!  (If they did, perhaps its top leadership would still be wondering where 
does China's true comparative advantage lay, and whether one should create 
                                          
65   https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Constitucion_Chile.pdf. 
66  For a study of this period, see Huneus (2014).  
67  Between 2014 and 2018, three quarters of CODELCO’s operating surplus went to the 
armed forces through this mechanism; and some serious incidents of corruption associated 
with these funds among top-ranking officers came to light recently as well 
(https://www.latercera.com/pulso/noticia/75-los-excedentes-generados-codelco-los-
ultimos-cinco-anos-fueron-las-ffaa/712691/).   
68  On Asia’s industrial policies, see Andreoni and Chang (2019); Khan (2015); and Wood 
(2002).  Even the IMF is now rethinking its attitude towards industrial policies (see Cherif 
and Hasanov, 2019).  
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“opportunities” or tax incentives to get there).  And until very recently, the same 
engineering “bias” is found among top government officials.  And across the 
country the most sought-after majors were engineering and natural sciences.  In 
this tradition, China’s current president is a chemical engineer; his predecessor a 
hydraulic engineer, and the one before him an electrical one. 
No wonder Asia is on track to account for 50% of global GDP and 40% of 
global consumption.  As McKinsey (2019a) states, there has already been 
a real shift in the world’s centre of economic gravity, … [as] the future [has] 
arrived even faster than expected. … The question is no longer how quickly Asia 
will rise; it is how Asia will lead.   
 
In Latin America, meanwhile, orthodox economists and lawyers rule in politics 
and policy-making ─and they have also become the perfect “faceless 
bureaucrats” of our huge and timid state apparatuses, ready to argue that the 
best way to solve a problem is by creating yet another government commission.  
And these two professions compete to see which provides more practitioners of 
the fine ideological art of boring everybody into submission with debates such as 
whether subsidies should be allocated horizontally or vertically.  Surely Freud had 
economists in mind when he developed his concept of the “narcissism of the small 
differences”.69  
It is not by chance that ‘the Iberian tradition’ has been far more creative 
in painting, sculpture, music, theatre, literature and film than in its contributions 
to the social sciences.  This lack of “enlightenment” beyond the arts and letters is 
likely to be associated with the lack of sophistication in the exercise of power by 
the State.  Foucault’s proposition that knowledge and power are interrelated, one 
presupposing the other, comes to mind.  His idea is that the development of 
social sciences has been interrelated with the deployment of ‘modern’ forms of 
power.  These needed to be exercised with a much more fine-grained knowledge 
of society and of forms of domination.  The modern State required the 
development of the social sciences to find more sophisticated forms of 
‘disciplining’ individuals and groups; that is, more sophisticated forms of 
knowledge were required for more sophisticated technologies of power.70   
In the Iberian world, instead, since states have often governed through 
remarkably “un-modern” means, and at times via crudely mediated forms, they 
have required a much lower level of development of the social knowledge, and 
less sophistication in their forms of control.  Lacking the objective incentives, this 
tradition has not generated in their social sciences the remarkable creativity 
found (in its past and present) in the arts and letters.  Basically, where is the 
Picasso of Ibero-American economics?  Or the Neruda of its political sciences or 
sociology?  
 And while Asia forges ahead, Latin America (where wishful-thinking has 
become pure self-deception) still deludes itself into believing they have finally 
created something resembling a “perpetual motion” machine ─one which doesn’t 
require much re-engineering or the injection of new energy (net productive 
investment) to keep producing all-time record profits.  But here Latin America is 
not alone; if the US, for example, had the same income and inequality as now but 
its share of investment to GDP were as it was pre-Reagan, over US$1 trillion 
more would be being invested per year.  In fact, net private investment has all 
                                          
69  As evidence for vertical policies comes from the real world, and those with the “purity of 
the neo-liberal beliefs” have only been able to counterattack with algebra based on odd 
assumptions, this debate has become yet another dialogue of the deaf among economists.  
70  For an analysis of these issues, see Palma (2014).  
 37
but disappeared!71  In turn, if it had the same level of national income, but the 
level of inequality when Reagan was elected, the top 1% would today be earning 
about US$2 trillion less than it actually does.72  And in terms of wealth 
distribution, if wealth inequality in the US was the same as when Reagan was 
elected, the top 1% would today own only half of its current wealth —and the top 
0.1% just one third, and the top 0.01% a mere one fifth.73  This should come as 
no surprise: while the S&P 500 soared by more than 320% between 2009 and 
mid-2018, the longest bull market on record (feeding on what the chief economist 
of the Bank of England now calls corporate “self-cannibalism”), creating more 
than US$18 trillion of (virtual) wealth along the way, the median household 
wealth was actually falling!74    
At the same time, the ratio of private investment vis-à-vis the income 
share of he top 10% has fallen by half since Reagan was elected ─from over half 
to about one-quarter; that is, what we find is a clear “reverse catching-up” in 
motion with countries at the other side of the Rio Grande, as this new ratio is 
even below Chile’s and Brazil’s, and is now marching towards South Africa’s 
level.75  It almost puts Chile’s status quo look in a different light ─a phenomenon 
that can only reinforce the political and ideological convictions of those wanting to 
prolong it.  
What has happened to taxation among the OECD neo-liberal élite is yet 
another example of this “reverse catching-up”; for them, paying their taxes (i.e., 
paying for the many free public goods they get) is now the equivalent to tipping 
in a restaurant ─at their discretion, and only if they feel they’ve got good service.  
For example, a recent IMF study reports that “nearly 40% of worldwide foreign 
direct investment passes through empty corporate shells …with no real business 
activities”.  That is, “Some US$12 trillion worldwide is just phantom corporate 
investments …designed to minimise companies’ tax liabilities”.76  So, the current 
Chilean government (in its search for ways of giving new impetus to its current 
exhausted development strategy) now wants to cash in on this growing business 
by transforming Chile into a tax haven ─or what today is euphemistically called “a 
financial centre”.77  And Chile has a good starting point, as it has already 
                                          
71   BEA (2019).  
72  Palma (2019a).  
73  On wealth inequality, see Saez and Zucman (2016).  
74  Palma (2019a).   
75  The contrast between Apple and Samsung is revealing in this in terms of the contrast 
between US and emerging Asia’s corporations.  Following Trump’s tax cuts, Apple 
announced buybacks and dividends of another US$100 billion on top of the US$ 210 billion 
it had already committed since 2012 —a sum greater than the market value of all but 20 
of the US’s biggest listed companies.  At the same time, Samsung announced a US$160 
billion three-year investment plan (from artificial intelligence to biopharmaceuticals), which 
for the Financial Times, “[it could] be regarded as the world’s biggest [corporate] 
investment.” (https://www.ft.com/content/85fca3dc-9b90-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d). 
76  https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-
havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm.  See also 
https://www.ft.com/content/37aa9d06-d0c8-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f; see also Cobham 
and Janský (2017).  For the Danske mega-scandal, see Palma (2019a).  Even the FED now 
provides a helping hand to money laundering and tax evasion; while the EU took its 
largest-denomination bill out of circulation to combat money laundering, the FED has 
doubled the number of hundred-dollar bills in circulation since 2008 (to US$1.3 trillion).  
That is, in a supposed ‘digital era’, now there are 13 billion hundred-dollar bills stuffed into 
wallets, safes and suitcases globally, helping to hide transactions 
(www.ft.com/content/4caa021c-3f9d-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44). 
77  See, for example, 
https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2019/09/10/960826/ChileDay-londres-
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accumulated a lot of expertise in the fiscal paradise business ─from the President 
down.  (I wonder what new craze will come next).78  
In essence, this is what the neo-liberal mode of accumulation is all about: 
setting in motion a process that is both highly inequalising, and highly 
unproductive.79  And when people lose their patience, and things starts to 
become politically unsustainable, one can always blame China…  (Or invent 
Brexit, or revive neo-fascist movements, or stoke up xenophobia, or religious 
fundamentalism ─there’s ample choice).   
And it is unlikely that this will ever change unless governments start doing 
something about it.  In fact, as already mentioned, in copper, instead of an 
export’s “upgrade”, what we find is the opposite: a collapse in the share of 
refined and blister copper in copper exports.  As Keynesians, Post Keynesians, 
structuralists, some Schumpeterians and many others argue, and emerging Asia 
confirms, what one exports can be as relevant for economic growth as to how 
much one exports.80  In short, sustainable growth is product-specific.81   
One of the many lessons from the resource-intensive emerging Asian 
countries is that in order to force the “upgrade”, some direct discouraging of 
exports of unprocessed commodity is essential.82  In copper this could be done by 
a royalty that is much higher for the exports of copper concentrates, and then 
decreases proportionally to the degree of domestic refining.  The same in the 
forestry industry: higher for wood-chips, and lower for MDF and other higher 
value-added products of the industry.  
If producers insist on exporting unprocessed commodities, then at least 
the royalty could capture their rents and help finance public health and education, 
R&D, or other complementary capital ─and fund remedial action for the huge 
environmental damage of some of the extractive industries.83   
This discouraging of the exports of unprocessed commodities would be 
similar to having opened ISI to international competition in the 1960s.  And those 
who oppose this “upgrade” now do so for the same reasons than they did before 
during ISI: in order to continue with easier forms of rent-seeking accumulation.  
If for the South Korean capitalist élite (as quoted) its comparative advantage was 
doing what they wanted, but doing it well, for the Chilean one it is how to use 
widely different institutions and development strategies effectively to achieve 
their fairly immutable rent-seeking goals.84  
Unless some actions to force the “upgrade” is taken, Chile ─and the rest of 
Latin America─ seems condemned to be stuck in their new role in the world 
                                                                                                                       
santiago-centro-financiero.html.  Long gone are the days when transforming Chile into a 
high-tech-service exporting economy was the fad of the day.  
78  For a hint of the pathetic lack of new ideas among the capitalist élite, see 
https://www.cnnchile.com/economia/sofofa-proyectos-impacto-crecimiento-
economico_20191004/. 
79  Palma (2019a).   
80  Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006).   
81  Palma (2005; 2008; and 2019b).  
82  For example, in the 1970s, Malaysia banned the exports of unprocessed timber; and in 
2014, Indonesia did the same with a range of commodities.  
83  On the Chilean educational system, see Meller (2019); and Fundación SOL (2019).  On 
health, see Unger et a. (2008).  And on environment, see for example, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/apr/24/mining-logging-chile-
without-water. 
84  For an analysis (using simple game-theory language) of the changing strategies 
followed by the Chilean élite to accomplish this in terms of inequality, see Palma (2011, 
Appendix 1). 
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economy as “double-periphery”.  To its traditional periphery status vis-à-vis 
industrialised countries, it has now added a new one vis-à-vis emerging Asia.  
And everything seems to indicate that for a “double-periphery”, the middle-
income trap ─or “glass ceiling”─ gets ever more difficult to break.   
And the Chilean economy eventually got to a crossroads: it either had to 
force the “upgrade” in both components of its dual economy, or it had to engineer 
ways of providing more oxygen to its fairly exhausted development strategy ─one 
(as suggested) that was already gasping for air.  Perhaps not surprisingly, so far 
it has chosen the latter: in the same way that it tried to give a momentum to its 
extractive sectors by expanding the horizontal diversification of its resource 
economy to neighbouring countries (as well as some of other activities of its 
economy), it also tried to do the same with that other component of its dual 
economy ─the one that was running out of cheap labour─ by following an active 
policy of mass immigration. 
On the horizontal diversification abroad, and according to balance of 
payment statistics, the assets of the “international investment position” of the 
financial and non-financial private sector (not counting pension funds) reached 
US$383 billion ─about 30% larger than that year’s GDP.  And a great deal of it 
was financed by acquiring foreign debt, leaving Chile as the country with the 
largest corporate debt as a share of GDP in the whole emerging world ─and with 
very little to show for it at home.85   
However, on the positive side, this has at least helped the Chilean 
oligarchy to become a bit more democratic, as easy access to mobile assets has 
provided them with an expedient “exit strategy”.  That is, they no longer have to 
be so geographically tied to their “fixed” investments.  Although the purely 
extractive side of commodities in their home country will always be the core of 
their accumulation (where else can they hope for this kind of returns?), the 
investment of their surplus ─plus additional debt─ can be now done conveniently 
in a geographically wide portfolio.86  
And on the need to replenish the labour market with low-wage workers, as 
shortages of cheap labour began to threaten to change Chile’s labour market into 
a less asymmetric one, the capitalist élite and “new-left” governments panicked.  
What followed was a deliberate policy of labour market manipulation via opening 
borders, which brought in more than one and a half million people between the 
Lagos administration and the time of writing this paper.  This is an injection of 
more than 10% to Chile’s labour force ─and 7% to the total population.87  And 
like most immigrant communities, their labour participation is over 80%, and 
many (not surprisingly) are underpaid relative to their skills.  
Here it is important to emphasise that this influx of immigrants was 
generated by a Chilean “pull”, not by an external “push” ─i.e., it started with 
deliberate changes in immigration policy, not with political disturbances in 
neighbouring countries.  This only happened at a much later stage with the 
                                          
85  The Economist (2018).  For Chilean FDI, see ECLAC (2019).  One entrepreneur declares 
no intention to invest in Chile again ─except in mineral-extraction, of course 
(http://www.latercera.com/noticia/luksic-el-tamano-que-tenemos-ya-es-importante-para-
este-pais/).  But he was happy to bid for petrol stations in Argentina; buy a large 
shareholding in a busted Spanish bank; buy a large property in Washington that end’s up 
being “rented” to Trump’s daughter; and pay a large sum for one of the largest chains of 
truck’s service stations in the US ─when the days of diesel engines are already numbered.  
Anything would do, except invest in Chile’s “upgrade” ─not even in processing the minerals 
of his own large copper mines. 
86  On this issue, see Boix (2003); and Palma (2019a).  
87  Rojas and Vicuña (2019).  
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economic collapse of Venezuela.  And a large percentage of immigrants came 
legally, by plane, into Santiago’s main airport (no visa requirements), in a way 
that ended up being a paradise for human trafficking gangs, who organised the 
logistics, the transport, and then profited from the horrific conditions in which 
many of these immigrants ended up living in Chile. 
Also, did anyone pushing for the new immigration policy worry about the 
lack of spare capacity in housing, health service, education, transport, and all 
those basic services desperately needed by immigrants?88  
This huge process of immigration may have had many highly positive 
impacts on Chilean society in terms of a much-needed cultural diversity, and 
many immigrants did have difficult life stories, but as far as the PE-DE model is 
concerned it was a matter of policy, and not of a newly discovered feeling of 
human solidarity ─as the official discourse may have wanted us to believe ex-
post.  Had this been the case, what about starting by eliminating poverty at 
home?  Or by not sabotaging the only hope of those living on the edge for an 
increased wage (which was the scarcity of cheap labour)?  In fact, in the last 
quarter of 2018 the median net wage (400 thousand pesos) was not high enough 
even to bring a family of four above the poverty line (423 thousand pesos) ─and 
this in a country that likes to think of itself ad portas of becoming a developed 
country (a good example of wishful thinking becoming delusional).89  In fact, 
another source reports that 60% of workers with a full-time job earned less than 
that.90  Does anyone really believe that those meagre wages really reflect the 
value of their marginal productivity?   
And if they wanted to cool the labour market, what about helping 
repatriate those thousand of Chileans, and their families, who had to leave the 
country as political refugees during the dictatorship ─and now would like to come 
back home with their extended families, but haven’t the means to do so?  (Does 
anyone still remember, or care, about their existence?).  
Although immigration is unquestionably a very positive development from 
many points of view, what has happened in Chile shows that one can have too 
much of a good thing, and at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.  And 
thanks to capital flight and indiscriminate immigration, the traditional dual-
economy model has artificially extended its “sell-by date” by a considerable 
amount of time.  In turn, far-right parties also got a new lease of life with rising 
xenophobia.  
The Scandinavian and higher middle-income emerging Asian models are 
mainly about being less tolerant with low-end businesses that require low-end 
labour.  The Chilean policy of “pulling” a wave of immigration to give oxygen to 
the low-productivity sectors that refuse to modernise aims at exactly the 
opposite.  And as Churchill emphasised, all such low wages do is subsidise 
inefficient producers,  
It is a serious national evil that any class of His Majesty's subjects should receive 
less than a living wage in return for their utmost exertions. … [W]here you have 
what we call sweated trades, … the good employer is undercut by the bad, and the 
bad employer is undercut by the worst. … [W]here those conditions prevail you 
have not a condition of progress, but a condition of progressive degeneration” 
(https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1909/apr/28/trade-boards-
bill). 
 
                                          
88  Rojas and Vicuña (2019).  
89  And (not surprisingly) the median hides a huge gender gap.  See INE (2019); and MDS 
(2018).  
90  Durán and Kremerman (2019).  
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The irony is that when Chile got nearer a unique position in which market forces 
(for once) began to threaten to transform its labour market into a more efficient 
(and civilised) one ─one with more parity of bargaining─, as well as forcing a 
faster pace of productivity growth ─including creating the necessity for a much 
faster absorption of robotics and artificial intelligence─, there came a 
“progressive” government, full of born-again “neo-phobics”, happy to stop such 
audacity by sheer labour-market manipulation.  From a Foucauldian perspective, 
it was all about putting life back in order.91 
 
Conclusion  
Latin America is a region whose critical social imagination has stalled since the 
1982 debt crisis and the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Although this has happened in 
most of the world, in Latin America both the process of re-legitimisation of 
capital, and the downswing of critical thinking have been particularly pronounced 
as neo-liberalism —with its sophisticated technologies of power and its 
unsophisticated economic policies— has conquered the region, including most of 
its progressive intelligentsia, just as completely (and just as fiercely) as the Holy 
Inquisition conquered Spain.92  
For Ortega y Gasset (1918), the main obstacle to Latin America’s progress 
was the overabundance of “self-satisfied individuals”, who show “...a narcissistic 
tendency to use reality as a mirror for self-contemplation”.  Something that is 
even more pervasive today, as it now involves individuals from both sides of the 
political spectrum.  For him, this self-satisfaction could become a major barrier 
for change as it limits “…critical analysis and progress”.  This is precisely the point 
I am trying to make in this paper: a “self-satisfied” capitalist élite, interacting 
with a similarly natured political class and a tamed bureaucracy, does not just 
benefit objectively from narcissistic ideologies full of “absolute certainties”, but is 
also subjectively prone to “neo-phobia” (i.e., it is intrinsically averse to breaks 
from routine).  This is the antithesis of what is needed for the passage from 
middle to high-income status, as this is all about having the “upgrade flexibilities” 
in entrepreneurship and policy which are necessary to diversify the economy 
towards more knowledge-intense activities (characterised by higher potentials for 
sustainable productivity growth).   
That is, “self-satisfaction” becomes a serious evolutionary hindrance, as 
for Ortega y Gasset “...human history is the product of discontent” ─including, of 
course, with the status-quo.  In other words (and in a Gramscian sense), the 
“middle-income trap” is essentially an ideological one.  As in the “Hotel California” 
line in my epigraph, “We are all just prisoners here, of our own device”. 
In neo-liberal Latin America arrogance still trumps knowledge and reason.  
As its status-quo is full of “absolute certainties”, there are few, if any, far more 
creative “uncomfortable uncertainties” in sight.93  And these rigidities are proven 
to be a major obstacle for progress because, as Darwin’s worldview teaches us, 
the species that survive are those most responsive to a changing environment.  
However, as evolution inevitably generates uncertainty among dominant agents, 
the pre-Darwinian rigidities built at the core of the model aim at avoiding that.  
The TPP-11, for example, is just a vain attempt at securing “a regulatory and 
policy freeze" ─vain in its two meanings: egocentric and futile (the latter because 
change can’t be stopped ─it can be distorted, though).  
                                          
91  Foucault (1994).  
92  Palma (2014).  
93  See Palma (2014).  The Governor of Argentina’s Salta province famously said: “I am a 
man of few but fixed ideas”.   
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Perhaps this is what differentiates us most from emerging Asia, where 
tensions in their development strategies are usually unravelled by “moving 
forward”.  In Latin America, instead, as a great deal of energy is wasted trying 
“to stop time”, there is not much left for progress.  Such mediocre social 
imagination corrodes not only our economy, but also our democracy.  
Following this perspective, I would argue that the illiterate of the 21st 
century are not those who cannot read and write, nor those who cannot learn, 
but those who cannot unlearn and relearn in order to be responsive to change.   
The relentless pragmatism of emerging Asia helps them differentiate 
between “means” and “ends”.  In essence, their policymaking is based on the 
assumption that no set of economic policies has an intrinsic value in itself.  They 
are just mere means to an end, which is the rapid “catching-up” with the 
production frontier ─and then, how to push it forward─ in a world market full of 
distortions and uncertainties.  In Latin America, meanwhile, the “fetishism of 
means” leads to a systematic confusion between them and ends.  This is one key 
characteristic of the neo-liberal ideology (especially in its “Anglo-Iberian” 
variety): to give some kind of metaphysical dimension to mere economic policies, 
transforming them into the exactly the opposite of what the Lipsey and Lancaster 
theorem ─and Keynes’ General Theory (especially Book 1 and Chapter 12)─  
teach us.94  
And nowhere is this confusion of means and ends ─of “the secular with the 
sacred”─ more evident than in the Chicago version of neo-liberalism, where there 
is no room whatsoever for the neo-classical theorem of the “second-best”. 
Another lesson from the economic and political history of the South is that 
the success of ambitious development strategies needs those at the top to be 
able to muster a large degree of support.  And although this happened in Lula’s 
Brazil and 1990s’ Chile (and Mandela’s South Africa at about the same time), 
there was then no ambitious development strategy in sight.  Neo-liberalism, as an 
ideology, proved such an effective technology of power that it paralysed critical 
thinking in most of its opposition.  In fact, it went even further because as Žižek 
(2008) says, the ultimate ideological defeat is when one starts telling stories of 
others as if they were one’s own. 
And as Walter Benjamin remarked, behind every rise of fascism lies the 
failure of a major political project: in Latin America (but not only there), it is the 
failure of the so-called ‘Third Way’.  Its very dullness seems to have caused such 
a failure of the collective social imagination that otherwise unthinkable options 
have now become possible. 
There is nothing new in oligarchies preferring a “low-hanging fruit” 
existence by emasculating the state and manipulating markets;95 what is novel is 
how easily they are now able to get away with it.  From this perspective, the so-
called “curse of natural resources” (a now fashionable concept in some neo-
institutional publications that seek to explain the development failure of many 
                                          
94  Book 1 is essentially about the possibility of a general shortfall in demand; and Chapter 
12 about how investment decisions are inevitably made under radical uncertainty, to which 
there is no rational answer (these, therefore, not only tend to lead to sub-optimal levels of 
investment, but also to occasional drastic revisions, giving rise to economic instability ─for 
an analysis of similar issues, but from a different perspective, see Caballero and Engel, 
1999).  On how Keynesians could be divided between “Chapter 12ers and Book 1ers”, see 
Krugman (2011). 
95  Even Adam Smith (1776) warns us: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 
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resource-rich countries) is clearly not about natural resources per se.96  Instead, 
what has been cursed is a particular type of rentier ideology, not a particular type 
of asset.  
And now, with such abundance of cheap labour and horizontal 
diversification abroad, the contrast between South Korea and Chile can continue 
unaltered: if in the former one finds among the top 0.01% entrepreneurs 
producing some of the best cars in the world, in Chile some get there (top 
0.01%) by filling the tank of those cars with petrol.97  And in Chile to get to the 
0.01% means earning a share of national income about six times larger than in 
South Korea ─even though in the latter country this group includes some of the 
most successful entrepreneurs in the history of capitalism.  Surely we can’t blame 
the “invisible hand” for that ─it is all about sheer market manipulation and feeble 
governments!98  Paradoxically, what seems to be alien to the neo-liberal 
paradigm is what capitalism is really about.  
Instead, some trade and industrial policies mixed with some Asian-style 
capital controls and shortages of cheap labour might have given domestic capital 
little option but to invest locally in more productivity-enhancing activities.  What 
the neo-liberal paradigm seems unable to grasp is that it is one thing to create 
market opportunities, quite another to ensure that there are sufficient market 
compulsions to guarantee that these opportunities are taken up.  
It is often acknowledged that the only historical legitimacy of capitalism —
that is, the legitimacy of small élites to appropriate such a large proportion of the 
social product— rests on those élites’ capacity to use it productively, and to 
develop the productive forces along the way.  And it can only do this by 
reinvesting most of that huge share.  Keynes (1919), for example, explains the 
contrast at the end of the 19th Century between ‘emerging’ Germany and the US 
vs. ‘mature’ Britain during the (investment-intensive) Third Technological 
Revolution, or third great surge of industrialization99 ─that of the ‘Age of Steel, 
Electricity and Heavy Engineering’:  
The new rich of the nineteenth century …preferred the power which investment 
gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption.… Herein lay, in fact, the 
main justification of the capitalist system. If the rich had spent their new wealth on 
their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime 
intolerable. 
 
There is not much danger of finding these enlightened attributes in the newly rich 
anymore, as the “discreet charm” of the Latin American-style bourgeoisie has 
now spread throughout the Western World.  We are all now indeed converging, 
but we are doing so towards features typical of Latin-style middle-income 
countries, such as mobile élites creaming off the rewards of economic growth, 
and “magic realist” politics that lack self-respect if not originality.  Given this 
“reverse catching-up” of advanced countries, perhaps we should be saying to 
them: “Welcome to the Third World!”  
                                          
96  DiJohn (2010). 
97  Palma (2019a).  
98   A good example is what happens with pensions: while all workers (except for the 
armed forces) are forced to pay all their pension contributions to the private pension 
system (AFPs), the state ends up paying four-fifth of all pensions anyway ─including one-
third of those paid by AFPs (which is supposed to be a subsidy to pensioners, when in 
actual fact is just a subsidy to AFPs ─so they can continue doing more of the same) 
(http://publicaciones.manuelriesco.cl/2019/05/son-las-cotizaciones-estupido.html).  It’s no 
wonder that Chile has such a capacity to generate “silly-billies”!  
99  For a comprehensive analysis of this period, see Pérez (2002).  
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I sometimes wonder whether the unique brand of neo-liberalism bought by 
so many Latin Americans is just shorthand for “nothing left to decide” —and in 
the case of the new-left, of course, “nothing left to think about critically”.100  
Indeed, in the West (north and south) the attitude today towards policy-making 
resembles that of the great physicist Lord Kelvin at the beginning of the 20th 
century.  Then, he famously declared (while Einstein was finishing primary 
school) that in physics “there is nothing new to be discovered […] All that remains 
is more and more precise measurement”.101  
Apparently Latin American élites today would settle for nothing less than a 
political class that lets them have complete freedom to manipulate markets and 
to free-ride on public goods paid by others, and to have Stepford Wives-style 
bureaucracies.102  So, life is now not as easy as a high middle-income status 
might suggest, as one has not only a family but also an oligarchy and a huge 
faceless bureaucracy to support.  
From the perspective of its development potential (and borrowing from 
psychoanalysis), perhaps what most characterises Chile (and Latin America) in 
this respect ─especially its main actors (both private and public)─ seems to be an 
addiction to an impoverished life.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
100  See Palma (2014). 
101  Kelvin (1900).  
102  Some examples in CIPER (2017). 
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